



C. C. BRIANT

# —HISTORY— OF THE SIXTH REGIMENT

Indiana Volunteer Infantry.

OF BOTH  
THE THREE MONTHS'  
AND THREE YEARS' SERVICES.

This work contains, not only a complete history of the Sixth Indiana Regiment, its trials and hardships, the battles in which it was engaged, but a full description of every battle, its results, etc., also the losses on both sides, the number engaged on both sides, who the commanding officers were, etc., a description of the country and the people and a thousand other items of general interest to both the old soldier and the general reader, interspersed with anecdotes of the war.

It also gives a record of every man that ever belonged to the regiment, telling when and where he enlisted, how long and in what capacity he served, showing his promotions, and what finally became of him, telling whether he was killed in action, died of wounds or disease, was captured or discharged, etc., and just when and where these things happened. Written from personal knowledge and the records by the chosen Historian of the Regiment,

VERSAILLES, IND.

C. C. BRIANT, Captain Company K.

INDIANAPOLIS:

WM. B. BURFORD, PRINTER AND BINDER.

1891

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE ARMY REORGANIZED.

A general forward movement—Our Corps moves, Dec. 27, by way of Triune—We push the enemy toward Murfreesboro—The enemy contests every inch of ground—A running fight for 20 miles—Rosecrans builds fires to deceive the enemy—But they don't deceive—Our right completely crushed—Sixth Indiana on reserve—Stragglers our first knowledge of disaster—We, too, fall back with the retreating army—We are nearly captured—We rally and repulse the enemy—We sleep on our arms in possession of the field—We win a victory the last day of the year—A hard fight New Year's day—Bragg out-generaled—Bragg comes again the 2d of January—Fifty-eight pieces of artillery sweep him from the field—Col. Millet deals the death blow—Bragg mortified and discouraged—January 3 finds us masters of the field—Midnight of the 3d, Bragg's army in full retreat—We bury the dead, Sunday, January 4—Results of the battle, etc.—The Sixth Indiana and her losses—We move into Murfreesboro—Go into camp.

Before we advance further I will give the changes made by General Rosecrans in his reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland, before he went into the fight at Murfreesboro, or so much of it, at least, as is necessary to properly locate our regiment and brigade, etc., in the fight.

Major-General A. McD. McCook was still our corps commander, and was designated as the right wing of the army in this coming battle. Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanded the Second Division of McCook's Corps. This division



HAGERMAN TRIPP.

was composed of three brigades, of which we were the Third, commanded by Colonel P. P. Baldwin, of our regiment. Then the Sixth Indiana Regiment was a part of the Third Brigade, Second Division of McCook's Corps, which formed the right wing of the army. I will simply add, in order to give the reader a general idea of the whole army under Rosecrans, at this time, that the left wing of the army was commanded by General Crittenden, while the center was under General Thomas, who had superseded General Gilbert.

McCook's Corps consisted of three divisions—the First Division, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis; the second, commanded by General R. W. Johnson, while the third was commanded by General P. H. Sheridan.

The Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. P. Baldwin, consisted of—

Sixth Indiana Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tripp.

First Ohio Regiment, commanded by Major J. A. Stafford.

Ninety-third Ohio Regiment, commanded by Colonel Charles Anderson.

Fifth Kentucky Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. W. Berry.

Fifth Indiana Battery, commanded by Captain P. Simonson.

On the morning of December 26th, Rosecrans ordered a forward movement of the whole army.



McCook was to move his command on the Nolinsville pike to Triune.

Davis took the advance of the right wing with the First Division. He moved from camp at 6 o'clock, on the Edmonson pike. The Third Division, under Sheridan, moved on the Nolinsville pike, followed by Second Division, under Johnson.

The advance under both of these columns encountered the cavalry pickets of the enemy within two miles of the Federal picket line. As we advanced there was constant skirmishing until the heads of each of these columns reached Nolinsville. About one mile south of the town the enemy made a determined stand in a defile and upon the hills through which the pike ran at this place, known as Knob's Gap. They had it well guarded by their artillery, and opened fire at long range on General Davis, who brought up two of his batteries and opened up on them in a manner that soon threw them into confusion, while Colonel Carlin's brigade of his division charged their position, capturing two guns and several prisoners. Our brigade did not get into this engagement, but followed with Sheridan's troops in supporting distance all day. Davis alone had proved an overmatch for the enemy without our assistance, and had driven him from his position all along the line, but by this time Johnson and Sheridan had come up, and night coming on we bivouacked for the night.

General McCook ordered a forward movement the next morning, the 27th, toward Triune, but a dense fog, so thick as to forbid the distinction of

friend from foe, prevented an early advance, and it was deemed hazardous to press an engagement on unknown ground.

This time General Johnson had been put forward in the lead, and in our attempt to advance early in the morning we struck the enemy in force. The forenoon was used up by heavy skirmishing and playing on the enemy with the artillery. In the meanwhile McCook learned that Hardee was in position in our immediate front, and had been in line of battle since the night before. The fog lifted about noon and Johnson's division was pushed forward, followed by that of Sheridan. As we approached Triune we found the enemy had burned the bridge across Wilson's Creek and retired, leaving a battery of six pieces, with cavalry supports, to hold the crossing.

The Sixth Indiana, along with the balance of our brigade, was placed on the skirmish line. We advanced upon the enemy, who made a very feeble resistance, then withdrew their battery, followed by the cavalry, moving off rapidly toward Eaglesville. We repaired the bridge, crossed and went into camp beyond Wilson's Creek. The resistance made to McCook's Corps had delayed the whole line, and then the boys will remember the incessant rain on the 26th and 27th, rendering the pikes very muddy, while the cross-roads were almost impassable. The condition of the roads and unwieldy condition of the army made it a matter of necessity to move slowly.

The 28th being Sabbath there was no general advance. General McCook sent forward General Willich's brigade on a reconnoissance to ascertain the direction of Hardee's retreat. General Willich advanced seven miles on the Shelbyville road and learned that he had retired to Murfreesboro.

Our corps lay here all day, but the next day, the 29th, McCook, leaving our brigade at Triune to cover the extreme right, moved forward with the remainder of his command, on a country road known as the "Bole Jack" road, toward Murfreesboro. That night McCook went into camp, arranging his corps in line of battle across the Wilkinson pike. The next day, the 30th, our brigade was ordered up from Triune, and we took our place in line along with our division. Very early on the morning of this day General McCook was ordered to move forward on the Wilkinson pike. Sheridan took the front, with Davis next, while Johnson brought up the rear. I suppose Johnson was put in the reserve on account of our brigade not being up yet when they moved. As Sheridan advanced, the enemy's resistance was more and more obstinately opposed, and when he got within two and a quarter miles of Murfreesboro it became necessary to deploy General Davis on the line of battle. Our division was still in the reserve. All idea that Bragg did not intend to give us battle right here, and without giving back another inch, had vanished, and I believe that every soldier in the army had made up his mind

on this point. He had also made up his mind that the task we had undertaken was not only a big one, but a hard and dangerous one, and while a fellow is back in the rear, just far enough to be in the way of the stray balls, he has plenty of time to think of all these things. For my part, I had rather be right up on the front line, so that if I had to be killed it could be said of me that I died at the front, and not that I was killed by a stray ball away back in the rear, and, anyhow, I think that one place is just about as safe as the other. After Davis took his place on the front line the business amounted to more than a skirmish, as both armies got down to business. There would have been nothing very serious occur had not Carlin charged a battery which he failed to capture, incurring considerable loss. On this account Davis' division lost near two hundred men, while Sheridan lost seventy-five.

Shortly before sunset the rebel position was plainly discernible from Davis' front, and was formed running diagonally across the old Murfreesboro and Franklin road. In the afternoon McCook learned from a citizen the exact location of Bragg's army, which overlapped his right so far that he became greatly alarmed for its safety, and he immediately sent word to General Rosecrans. He then went to work at once to reform his lines. He also took the other two brigades of our division, which were commanded by Willich and Kirk, and placed them on the extreme right,

then held by Davis, directing them to form nearly perpendicular to the main line, so as to protect the right flank. Our brigade is still on the reserve. McCook considered this line a strong one, with open ground in the front for a short distance. At six o'clock in the evening McCook received an order from Rosecrans to have large and extended camp-fires made on the right, extending far beyond the right of the line, to deceive the enemy, and make him believe that troops were being massed there. Fires were built extending nearly a mile beyond the right of McCook's line. In this position the right wing rested in the cedars the night before the battle. The troops cutting cedar boughs for beds, and officers and men wrapping themselves in their blankets slept in frosty night-air with the silent stars looking down upon them.

"Just before the battle, mother,  
I am thinking, dear, of thee."

It may be presumptuous on my part to criticise the actions and plans of such a General as Rosecrans, but if the building of these fires on McCook's extreme right was not a mistake, then my judgment is at fault. McCook had already notified Rosecrans that his right was in danger, that his right rested nearly opposite Bragg's center, and took the responsibility of taking two brigades of his reserve and extending his right still farther. Rosecrans' idea of forcing Bragg to believe that he was massing forces on his right, certainly would not induce Bragg to weaken his line in McCook's

front, but rather to strengthen it. That portion of Bragg's army already in McCook's front, was entirely too heavy for it, without inducing him to make it still more so. McCook himself did not approve of an effort on Rosecrans' part to induce Bragg to strengthen or extend his own left, as from reliable information the Union army was in no condition to meet any such emergency. It would be only reasonable from the information Rosecrans already had, for him to either strengthen or try to conceal the weakness of his right. We are apt to guard against impending danger. If Rosecrans had not built those fires so far out on his right, Bragg might have thought that it would be necessary for him to leave more of his troops over with Breckenridge, and then it was positively known to Rosecrans that Breckenridge's division was all the rebel force left on the east side of the river. This force under Breckenridge constituted only about two-fifths of the whole rebel army: then pray, where was the other three-fifths but to be massed on the west side of the river, and consequently on the immediate front of McCook? And here is the great emergency which McCook saw, and tried to avert by taking two brigades of our division and placing them to protect and guard his extreme right. But when the heavy massed rebel columns came against them next morning, our thin, slender line, without any reserve at all you might say (for our brigade was



fully a mile in the rear and near Johnson's headquarters), was crushed and compelled to give way, while our right was continually overlapped faster than our line could be extended. The first intimation that we of the Sixth Regiment had of the disaster, was by seeing the flying, demoralized men coming to the rear.

Gen. Henry M. Cist, author of a history of the Army of the Cumberland, has this to say of Baldwin's brigade:

"Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of Johnson's division. Stragglers from Kirk's and Willich's brigades gave the first information to Baldwin of the disasters on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely time to post them in line of battle before the enemy, in immense masses, appeared on his front in short range, their left extending far beyond the extreme right of his line. Opening at once a destructive fire upon their dense masses with his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson's battery, posted near the woods in the rear of the first position, opened with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such overwhelming numbers that after half an hour's stubborn resistance, Baldwin was compelled to retire, not, however, until the enemy had flanked his right, and were pouring in an enfilading fire. As

it was, he barely made his escape, since, in a moment longer, his entire command would have been surrounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin endeavored to make another stand, but before he could form his line he was again forced back. Retiring slowly, with several halts in the cedars, Baldwin, with his brigade, reached the railroad, where the rest of the division was being re-formed.

"The right flank being driven from its position by the left of the enemy, Davis' division then felt the full force of the victorious sweep of the rebel troops, flushed with success and aided by the forces immediately in his front. Davis, as soon as the disaster on his right had fully developed, at once changed front and formed a new line, with his right brigade upon Post, nearly at right angles to its former position, and made all necessary disposition of his troops to receive the attack. Baldwin's brigade had hastily taken position and had already felt the force of the enemy's concentrated attack. Still the advancing lines of the enemy greatly overlapped the extreme right of Baldwin. Hardly had the troops been placed in this position before the enemy swept down in heavy masses upon both the flank and front, charging with the rebel yell. The two divisions of McCown's and Cleburne's troops, which had driven Johnson, hurled themselves upon Baldwin's and Post's brigades, while the fresh troops of Withers' division, composed of Wanigault's and Loomis'

brigades, rushed upon those of Davis, under Carlin and Woodruff, and upon that on the right of Sheridan's line, under Sill.

The change of position of Post's brigade gave to the two remaining brigades of Davis' division and Sill's brigade of Sheridan's command the length of division front, and on this the enemy made a united attack. After Baldwin had been compelled to retire, Post repulsed the attack on his brigade, and Carlin, Woodruff and Sill in the front drove back the assaulting column of the rebels with heavy loss."

The fight in this battle, so far as McCook's corps is concerned, was now virtually at an end, as he was ordered to the rear, where he re-formed his line on the opposite side of the Nashville pike, where it lay in position, while Van Cleve's division, which up to this time had not been engaged, was brought over from the left wing and placed on the front, just in time to receive the last charge made by the rebels on that day. This charge was handsomely repulsed, and the fighting for the day was over, and on the field where death had reaped such a heavy harvest on the last day of 1862 the troops slept on their arms, waiting for what the next day might bring forth. The night was clear and cold. The armies maintained their relative positions, with some picket firing occurring during the night. Thus ended the first day of one of the hardest-fought battles of the war.

Very little sleeping did the boys do this night,

as the whole night was taken up in making the necessary changes to get into position and to reform the lines to accord with the new order of things.—During the night we refilled our cartridge boxes, took parched corn for supper, and slept on our arms with our clothes on and one eye open, ready to be called into line for action on a moment's notice.

The extent of the disaster on the right was appalling and seemed at one time about to envelop the entire army. As the storm of battle passed down the line it reached Thomas, who, cool, calm and self-sustained, stood the test of one of the fiercest contests of the war. It was to him that Rosecrans first turned in the hour of disaster, and in him he trusted most. The commander of the army, too, was sorely tried. He had come to win victory, but in place of it defeat seemed almost inevitable. Reforming his lines and bravely fighting, he had hurled back Bragg's army before it had achieved any decisive success. Rosecrans knew that his losses had been extremely heavy, but those of the enemy had been still more severe. He felt that on a question of endurance his army would come out first, although the dash and onset of the rebels had at the opening been able to sweep all before them. In the face of an earnest effort on the part of some of his general officers to persuade him to fall back to Nashville and there throw up works and wait for reinforcements, Rosecrans determined to await the attack of the enemy



in the position of his lines Wednesday afternoon. He sent for the provision teams, ordered up fresh supplies of ammunition, and decided that if Bragg should not attack before these arrived that he himself would then resume offensive operations.

General Cist gives such a minute description of this battle that I deem it proper and right to quote from him still further. He says: "During the morning of January 1, 1863, the rebels made repeated attempts to advance on Thomas' front in the center, but were driven back before emerging from the woods. Crittenden was ordered to send Van Cleve's division across the river to occupy the position opposite the ford on his left, thrown forward perpendicular to it. The rebel right, under Polk, kept up a brisk skirmish fire on their front. Chalmers' brigade was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the 'Round Forest.' Bragg anticipating an attack on his right under Breckinridge, on the morning of the 1st, during the night ordered two brigades of that division to recross to the east side of the river. But none was made. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy showed signs of movement by massing large numbers of his troops on our right, at the extremity of an open field a mile and a half from the Murfreesboro pike. Here the rebels formed in line six deep, and massed thus heavily remained without advancing for over an hour. Gibson's brigade and a battery occupied the woods near Overall Creek, while Negley's was placed as support on

McCook's right. The evident design of Bragg during the day was simply to feel the lines of our army to find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Satisfied of this, he felt that he could maintain his position. He was not in condition to attack after the heavy hammering his army had received the day before.

"At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps commanders to feel our lines and ascertain Rosecrans' position. Fire was opened from four batteries on the center, and a demonstration in force was made by his infantry, followed by another on McCook, but at all points meeting with a heavy artillery fire, he concluded that our army still occupied the battle field in force. Bragg ordered Wharton's and Pegram's brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank of Stone River, immediately in Breckinridge's front. Soon after this a number of his staff officers discovered for the first time that Van Cleve's troops, sent over the day before, had quietly crossed unopposed, and had established themselves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk's line was commanded and enfiladed. It was an evident necessity either to withdraw Polk's line or to dislodge Van Cleve's. The first alternative was not to be entertained until the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter. Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckinridge the remaining brigades belonging to his division still with Polk, and Breckinridge reporting to Bragg received his orders. The attack

was to be made with the four brigades of Breckinridge's command, the cavalry protecting his right and co-operate with him. The crest of ground near the river, where Van Cleve's division was in position, was the point against which the main attack was to be directed. This taken, Breckinridge was to bring up his artillery and establish it on high ground, so as to enfilade our lines on the other side of the river. Polk was to open with a heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his advance. The signal for the attack was to be one gun from the center, and 4 o'clock was the hour set for the firing of this gun. Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the other some two hundred yards in the rear. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns, 12-pounders, were sent to aid in the attack.

Van Cleve's division was under command of Colonel Samuel Beatty with Grider's brigade for support, while a brigade of Palmer's division was placed in position on the extreme left to protect that flank. Drury's battery was posted in the rear. In front of Breckinridge's line was an open space some six hundred and fifty yards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines. Several hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, increasing the distance as it flowed beyond

our left. General Rosecrans had ordered Crittenden to send Beatty's division across the river as protection to the troops on the left and center, as from the high ground near the river, the enemy by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of our lines. During the morning of the 2d, Negley's division was ordered from the right and placed in position on the west bank of the river in the rear of Beatty's division as reserves, being here on the left of Hazen's and Cruft's brigades of Palmer's division.

As soon as Breckinridge's command entered the open ground to his front, the artillery massed on the west bank of the river by order of Crittenden, consisting of all the guns of the left wing, together with the batteries belonging to Negley's division and Stokes' battery, making fifty-eight guns in position, opened a heavy, accurate and destructive fire. Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached Beatty's infantry lines. Pressing forward, without waiting to throw out a skirmish line, Breckinridge's command swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire, and that of the infantry, and struck Price's and Grider's brigades, broke their lines, drove them from their position onto their support in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire division retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge behind the line of Negley's division, and there reforming.

Colonel John F. Miller, commanding the right

brigade of Negley's division, had ordered his troops to lie down under cover of the bluff of the river bank, and hold their fire until our troops from the other side crossed over and moved to the rear. As soon as the last of Beatty's men had passed through Miller's lines, he commanded the division to rise and open fire on the approaching rebels. Miller's fire was so effectively given as to cause the enemy at once to recoil. At the same time our artillery fire on the left was enfilading his ranks. His division soon wavered, and then began falling back. This was Colonel Miller's chance, and he ordered his troops to charge across the river, and to drive the enemy to their lines of entrenchments, which they did.

About the time Miller's command had got to the river, he received orders from General Palmer not to cross, but as he was driving the enemy nicely he did not obey, but ordered the troops forward. One of the enemy's batteries was posted in a wood close by and was keeping up a brisk fire on Miller's advance. He ordered his men to charge this battery, which they did, capturing three guns. At the time of the charge the Twenty-sixth Tennessee was supporting the battery. This regiment was broken by the assault and a large number of them captured with the colors of the command.

The commands under Generals Davis and Hazen were at once ordered across the river to support Miller. They secured a good line, and went into

position for the night. Bragg was deeply chagrined at the failure of Breckinridge's movement, but as night closed down he could do nothing but to prepare to defend himself on to-morrow. This he did by re-arranging his troops during the night. General Rosecrans ordered Davis to take and hold the line occupied by Beatty's division, while Crittenden's corps crossed the river, took position and entrenched themselves.

During the morning of the 3d Bragg ordered a heavy and constant picket firing to be kept up on his front, to determine whether our army still confronted him. At one point in the wood to the left of the Murfreesboro pike, the rebel sharpshooters had all day annoyed Rousseau, who requested permission to dislodge them and their supports, covering a ford at that place. About six o'clock in the evening two regiments from John Beatty's brigade of Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spear's brigade of Negley's division, under cover of a brisk artillery fire, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from their cover, but also from their entrenchments a short distance from the rear.

At noon Bragg, on consultation with his generals, decided to retreat, leaving the field in possession of his opponent. About midnight of the 2d, after Breckinridge's failure, Cleburne and Withers had sent a communication to Bragg, stating that there were but three brigades that were at all reliable, and even some of these were



more or less demoralized. They expressed their fears of great disaster, which should be avoided by retreat. Polk told Bragg that "after seeing the effect of the operations of to-day, added to that produced upon the troops by the battle of the 31st, I very greatly fear the consequences of another engagement at this place on the ensuing day. And," he continued, "we could now, perhaps, get off with some safety, and with some credit, if the affair was well managed. Should we fail in the meditated attack, the consequences might be very disastrous." Bragg saw very plainly that his generals were already whipped, and that to risk another engagement would be certain destruction to his army, so about midnight of the 3d he put his whole army under full retreat to a position behind Duck River.

Sunday, January 4, 1863, was spent by our boys in burying the dead of both armies.

The retreat of Bragg was rapid and complete, and only a feeble effort was made to follow him. He left, in his hospitals at Murfreesboro, all his sick and wounded. By this some 2,500 prisoners fell into our hands to be cared for. Thus, after seven days' battle, the Army of the Cumberland rested in Murfreesboro, having achieved the object of the winter campaign.

The final battle for Kentucky had been fought by Bragg and lost. Nashville, too, was now beyond his hopes, and for the great victory of the 31st, which he claimed, Bragg had but little to show.

In the heavy skirmishing, prior to the 31st, success attended every movement of the Union army. The heavy fighting of the early part of the 31st was all in Bragg's favor up to the time his advance was checked by our center and the new line on the right. From that time to the occupation of Murfreesboro, every movement resulted in favor of the army under Rosecrans, and the retreat of Bragg, after the defeat of Breckinridge, gave the halo of victory to our army as the result of the campaign. In his retreat Bragg admitted that he had gained nothing but a victory barren of results, at a cost to him of 10,125 killed, wounded and missing, 9,000 of whom were killed and wounded—over twenty per cent. of his command. Bragg's field return of December 10, 1862, shows an effective total of 51,036, composed of 39,304 infantry, 10,070 cavalry, and 1,662 artillery. This included the forces of Morgan and Forest, who were at this time absent raiding through Kentucky. These commands numbered 5,638. This taken from Bragg's total leaves 46,604, which was the strength of the army with which Bragg fought the battle of Stone River. General Rosecrans' force on the battle-field was: Infantry, 37,977; artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,200; total, 43,400—just 3,204 less than Bragg's army contained. The loss in the Union army was: Killed, 1,553; wounded, 7,245; and the rebels captured 2,800 men. This makes a total loss to the Union army of 11,598, or about

one-fourth of our entire army in the fight. Rosecrans lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon train. Bragg lost only three pieces of artillery.

The record shows no officers of the Sixth Indiana killed or wounded in the battle at Murfreesboro, while the killed, wounded and captured in the regiment during this battle are as follows:

## COMPANY "A."

George A. Benafield, killed December 31, 1862.  
Dow Conway, killed December 31, 1862.  
William T. Ellis, killed December 31, 1862.  
James Stevenson, wounded and died February 5, 1863.

## COMPANY "B."

Seeley Jayne, killed December 31, 1862.  
William Jolly, killed December 31, 1862.  
Jas. S. Kitts, wounded and discharged November 4, 1863.  
Jas. T. Shewmaker, killed December 31, 1862.  
Benjamin F. Simpson, killed December 31, 1862.

## COMPANY "C."

Enos Clark, killed December 31, 1862.  
Jas. W. Dunlap, wounded and discharged June 9, 1863.  
Robert C. Guy, wounded and discharged April 17, 1863.  
Ira Roberts, killed December 31, 1862.

David B. Simonton, wounded and died January, 1863.

Samuel S. Stull, killed December 31, 1862.

## COMPANY "D."

William Conway, captured and died in prison, February 25, 1863.

Jonathan Eades, wounded and discharged October 27, 1863.

Casper W. Land, wounded and discharged July 27, 1863.

William Wallace, wounded and discharged September 22, 1864.

John W. Long, wounded and discharged February 1, 1865.

## COMPANY "E."

Lost none killed, wounded or captured.

## COMPANY "F."

Elijah C. Bailey, wounded and died January 16, 1863.

## COMPANY "G."

Alexander Bradford, wounded and died February 16, 1863.

James Keay, killed December 31, 1862.

Gideon Powell, wounded and transferred to 68th Regiment.

## COMPANY "H."

Robert Chillis, wounded and discharged April 27, 1863.

James H. Earl, killed December 31, 1862.

James F. Fish, wounded and transferred, V. R. C., November 29, 1863.

John W. Sharp, killed December 31, 1862.

Adolph Cotton, wounded and discharged March 19, 1863.

## COMPANY "I."

Lost none killed, wounded or captured.

## COMPANY "K."

John Breese, wounded slightly.

James R. Castner, wounded severely.

John W. Hyatt, killed December 31, 1862.

John F. Harrell, killed December 31, 1862.

Lemon W. Jackson, wounded and died February 13, 1863.

Edward McVey, killed December 31, 1862.

Here we have a loss to the regiment of sixteen killed, seventeen wounded, and one captured—making a total loss of thirty-four men—and a further examination will show that all this was done on December 31st, and in the short time of fifteen or twenty minutes. The Sixth boys will remember that our brigade was on duty back at General

R. W. Johnson's headquarters, which was nearly a mile and a half in the rear of the balance of our division.

They will also remember that stragglers coming *pell mell* to the rear was the first intimation we had of the terrible disaster to our right. It was by the most rapid and quick work, as well as the splendid military ability of our brave and daring Baldwin and Tripp, that we got in line and was ready to meet the victorious foe, who were sweeping on through the cedar wood, apparently without any opposition, after our retreating and shattered ranks. How we rained the leaden hail into their dense columns as they approached us, which made them waver, and finally checked them, and would have sent them to the rear again but for the fact that they overlapped our right, which was entirely unprotected, and with many times our number. And, heavens! how we got to the rear when we started, and it was well that we started when we did, as a ten minutes' longer stay would have given many of us a trip down South for the winter, and, perhaps, for all time to come, as we may have met the fate of poor William Conway, who was captured, and died in prison the following February.

The soldierly bearing, and cool, deliberate conduct of Colonel P. P. Baldwin, in handling his brigade on this occasion should have won for him the title of "General," as he certainly deserved promotion, and no more so than our own dear



Colonel H. Tripp, whose bravery and courage on that day stamped him as a hero and commander well worthy the place he occupied, and capable of a much higher position. In fact, both officers and men of the old Sixth acquitted themselves nobly in this engagement. But, strange as it may seem, some laughable things happen on these quite serious occasions, and some of the boys to this day laugh heartily over a little affair that took place when we were falling back that day. The Captain of Company —, of our regiment, complained of being quite lame from rheumatism, so much so that he could scarcely get along even with the assistance of a large cane which he had carried all day. In the scramble for life or death when we started for the rear, it was, for a few minutes, "every fellow for himself," and our rheumatic Captain had been lost sight of for the time being. But just as we were getting out of the woods, and had struck the edge of a large field directly in our front, one of his boys was heard to call out: "My God! look yonder at Captain —, going across the field, he is just touching the high places."

It is not entirely the object of such a work as this to give the whole movement of the entire army, nor a full and complete description of a battle of such gigantic proportions as the one fought here at Murfreesboro. Still, I think I have been sufficiently minute to give the reader a tolerably idea of the battle, as well as the part taken in it by our regiment. Nearly all the fighting

done after the first day, that is after December 31, was done by Crittenden's Corps, which was hardly considered in the fight at all on the 31st. This of course kept our division on the reserve, and, in fact, out of any other *hot* engagements for the balance of the fight.

The cavalry, as well as some other small detachments, had preceded him, but on the 5th General Thomas, with his whole command, marched into Murfreesboro and went into camp on the Manchester and Shelbyville Road. This was followed by other commands until the whole army went snugly into winter quarters on the exact premises where Bragg had carefully stowed away his army for the winter only a short time before. Our brigade found quarters near Stone River, just a little southwest of Murfreesboro and between the town and river; and now that we are snugly tucked away in winter quarters, we can think back over the very eventful week just past, and indeed it is difficult to determine which to admire the more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops, that had

been driven from the field early in the morning, were re-formed under the eye of the commanding General, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannon mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day. One was like the resistless sweep of the whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand, sturdy resistance of the rocky coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces. In each of these the two armies displayed their distinctive features to the best, but the cool, deliberate, staying qualities of the Union Generals were never shown up to a better advantage than in the battle of Stone River.

## CHAPTER XII.

### IN MURFREESBORO AND RESTING UP.

Half rations—Potatoes a luxury—Repairing the railroad—The accidental shooting of Lieut. Holcomb—Bragg takes position at Shelbyville and Tullahoma—Our army reorganized—Plans for the Tullahoma campaign—The forward movement ordered—The Sixth Indiana broke camp June 24—The boys anxious to go—Our beautiful tented city goes down—We march for Liberty Gap—Our position and the part we took—The heroic deeds of the Sixth Indiana—What it takes to make a good soldier—The darkest cloud has a silver lining—Lord save, or we perish—The light begins to dawn—Our army closing in around Tullahoma—The pressure too great for Bragg—Again he retreats—Tired and weary we go into camp in Tullahoma—A short but brilliant campaign—Western Tennessee cleared of armed rebels—Hood went up to see Thomas—But he left before dinner.

During the first six months of 1863 the military operations of the Army of the Cumberland were of a minor character. The exhaustion attending the severe fighting of the last week of the previous year kept that army in camp for some time, to restore the losses of arms and material, to reclothe the army, to recruit the strength of the troops, to forward the needed supplies, and to build the necessary works to fortify Murfreesboro as a new base.

The repair of the most complete wrecking the Louisville Road ever suffered demanded Rosecrans' attention the first thing after the battle of Stone River. When the army left Nashville on the advance to meet Bragg the supplies in that city were very limited. With the disabling of the road it was impossible at that time to forward sufficient supplies to meet the wants of the command, and for the first few weeks while the army remained at Murfreesboro the troops were on half rations, and many of the articles constituting the "ration" entirely dispensed with, leaving but three or four on the list. The surrounding country for miles was scoured for forage and provisions. Everything of that kind was gathered in by raiding parties, not leaving sufficient for the actual necessities of the inhabitants. To such an extent did this go that to the officers with means to purchase such provisions as were to be had potatoes and onions became luxuries. But the railroad was soon repaired and the supplies necessary for the comfort of the army were issued, to the great delight and satisfaction of the boys, and for nearly six months it was "go on picket" to-day, and "drill" to-morrow, with inspection of arms on Sunday for a change. Many things occurred in the old Sixth during these six months that will be remembered by the boys as long as they remember anything. One was the presentation of a sword to Colonel Baldwin by the officers of the regiment. Another was the accidental shooting of Lieutenant

Jerome P. Holcomb, of Company G, on the morning of the 12th of May, by a squad of men who had just come off of picket duty and was ordered to go to a certain spot near the river and fire off their guns in a brushy thicket, just at a time when Lieutenant Holcomb was passing on the opposite side. He received the full force of a ball in a vital part of the body and lived only a few hours. Lieutenant Holcomb was buried with the honors of war in the military cemetery near Murfreesboro.

On Bragg's retreating from Murfreesboro he took position with a portion of his army and established his headquarters at Shelbyville. He then ordered part of his command to move to Tullahoma and there entrench, throwing up extensive earthworks and fortifications. Later he placed his troops in winter quarters.

Some important events took place during the first six months of 1863 that had a bearing on the fortunes of the Army of the Cumberland. On January 9, in recognition of the services of that army, by General Order No. 9 of War Department, that command was reorganized and the center, right and left were constituted the army corps designated as the Fourteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, under the same old commanders, while to General Rosecrans was committed the care and control of the entire army as commander-in-chief.

During the early part of June General Rosecrans commenced placing his troops in position



preparatory to a general advance. He organized a reserve corps from the various smaller commands ordered up from the rear and placed it under the command of General R. S. Granger, and about the 23d of June Rosecrans, having made all necessary arrangements for his command according to his plans, and learning of the favorable prospects at Vicksburg and of the movement of the force under Burnside into East Tennessee to take and hold Knoxville, issued the necessary orders for the advance of his army on that of the enemy.

#### THE ADVANCE ON TULLAHOMA.

In June, 1863, General Bragg's army was occupying a strong position north of Duck River. His infantry front extended from Shelbyville to Wartrace, and his cavalry rested at McMinnville on his right, and Spring Hill and Columbia on his left. General Polk's corps was at Shelbyville, having a *redan* line covered with abatis in front. A detachment from it was thrown forward to Guy's Gap. General Hardee's corps held Hoover's, Liberty and Bellbuckle Gaps. Chattanooga was the base, and Tullahoma was the chief depot of supplies.

General Rosecrans determined to concentrate the corps of Generals Thomas, McCook and Crittenden on the enemy's right, covering this movement by a feint upon his left, with General Granger's corps and the main portion of his cavalry.

The execution of this plan was commenced on the 23d of June by the advance of Granger's corps. The enemy's position was well chosen for either defense or retreat. He had in his front a range of hills, rough and rocky, through whose depressions, called gaps, the main roads to the south passed. These gaps were held by strong detachments, with heavy columns within supporting distance. Such was the strength of the position at Shelbyville that General Rosecrans anticipated stubborn resistance should he attack it, and in the event of success in assaults, the enemy could cover his retreat, having a route to his rear easily defended. He therefore proposed to turn General Bragg's right, and, avoiding his entrenchments at Shelbyville altogether, provoke a battle on ground of his own selection, or force him to retreat on a disadvantageous line.

This purpose involved the necessity of forcing the advanced forces from the gaps from the left to the right of the main position. The movement of troops to Triune had been made to create the belief that a direct attack would be made upon Shelbyville, and now, in the actual advance of his army, Rosecrans endeavored to keep up this impression. For this object, General Mitchell, commanding the first cavalry division, moved forward from Triune, and drove back the enemy's cavalry upon his infantry line. General Rosecrans also demonstrated with his cavalry from his left, and sent an infantry force to Woodbury, that the